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TORTS
I. GOVERNMENTAL MOTOR VEHICLE TORT CLAIMS ACT
The South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort
Claims Act' allows claims against the state for death, personal
injury, or loss of property caused by the negligent operation of a
vehicle by a government employee.2 In this limited area, the
statute abrogates sovereign immunity in favor of a person who
suffers injury or loss "to his person or property," if the person
otherwise would have an action against a private party.' The
Tort Claims Act does not expressly preclude third-party recov-
ery, but, in Watford v. South Carolina Highway Department,4
the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow a husband
to sue the state for loss of consortium because the husband was
not injured directly by the harm sustained by his wife in an au-
tomobile accident. Although earlier cases evidenced both broad
and narrow constructions of the statute,5 in Watford, the court
narrowly interpreted the provisions of the law and denied the
husband's derivative claim because it could not be considered an
injury "to his person." Watford, thus, delimited the scope of the
Tort Claims Act and gave preference to strict construction of its
terms.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-77-210 to -250 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
2. Id. Section 15-77-230 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
Any person sustaining an injury by reason of the negligent operation of
any motor vehicle while being operated by an employee of a governmental en-
tity while in and about the official business of such governmental entity may
recover in an action against such governmental entity such actual damages as
he may sustain ....
3. Id. § 15-77-220(5) (1976).
4. 273 S.C. 463, 257 S.E.2d 229 (1979).
5. See Morris v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 264 S.C. 369, 215 S.E.2d 430 (1975)
(construing "in and about the official business" in favor of the highway department, de-
nying any recovery to plaintiffs); Truesdale v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 264 S.C.
221, 213 S.E.2d 740 (1975)(holding that "negligent operation" includes a parked motor
vehicle, allowing recovery for wrongful death). In 1976, one observer noted these diver-
gent approaches. One view would interpret the Act with liberal regard for the rights of
the injured party; the other focused on the right of the state to be free from liability
unless it waived its immunity. The writer correctly predicted that the court would ulti-
mately protect sovereign immunity by strictly construing the statute. See Torts, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 28 S.C.L. REv. 401, 411-12 (1976).
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Watford's wife had sustained permanently disabling injuries
in a June 1974 automobile collision with a state highway patrol
car, giving rise to the husband's lawsuit under the Tort Claims
Act for medical expenses and loss of consortium.6 The trial judge
rejected those claims by sustaining the demurrer of the highway
department. He held, first, that the state cannot be sued without
its express consent; second, that statutes waiving the state's im-
munity must be strictly construed; and finally, that damages
under the Tort Claims Act could be recovered only for direct
injury to person or property and not for consequential damages.7
The validity of the doctrine of governmental immunity,8 without
which there would be no need for the Tort Claims Act, had not
been challenged; therefore, the single issue on appeal was
whether the trial judge had interpreted the statute properly to
preclude third-party recovery against the state for medical ex-
penses and loss of consortium.
Prior to the enactment in 1968 of the Tort Claims Act, gov-
6. Record at 1.
7. Id. at 2-3.
8. The source of governmental immunity in South Carolina is said to be Young v.
Commissioners of Rds., 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott. & McC.) 537 (1820), which recognized that
suits against public officials would be a "prolific source of litigation" and stated that
"where the officer acts for the public in general" no private action could be had against
him. See Belton v. Richland Memorial Hosp., 263 S.C. 446, 450, 211 S.E.2d 241, 242
(1975). The first case to expressly hold that no suit would lie against the state, however,
apparently was Treasurers v. Cleary, 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 372, 375 (1831). A long succes-
sion of cases followed holding that actions in tort could not be brought without consent
of the legislature, unless the injury constituted a taking of property without adequate
compensation. See Graham v. Charleston County School Bd., 262 S.C. 314, 204 S.E.2d
384 (1974); Chilton v. City of Columbia, 247 S.C. 407, 147 S.E.2d 642 (1966); Gasque v.
Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940); Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C.
379, 3 S.E.2d 42 (1939); Sherbert v. School Dist. No. 85, Spartanburg County, 169 S.C.
191, 168 S.E. 391 (1933); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481,
157 S.E. 842 (1921); Lowry v. Thompson, 25 S.C. 416, 1 S.E. 141 (1886).
In Belton, the supreme court in a per curiam opinion admitted "serious reservations
about the soundness and fairness" of the "entrenched" doctrine of sovereign immunity,
but refused to exercise recognized judicial authority to abolish it on grounds that reform
should come from the legislature. 263 S.C. at 450-51, 211 S.E.2d at 243. Justice Ness has
objected strongly to the continuation of governmental immunity, charging it is "an obso-
lete, inequitable principle." Lyon v. City of Sumter, 272 S.C. 359, 364, 252 S.E.2d 118,
121 (1979)(Ness, J., dissenting); see also Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Auth.,
266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E,2d 769 (1976)(Ness, J., dissenting). The court, however, has re-
mained steadfast in its commitment to protect the doctrine. See, e.g., Teague v. Chero-
kee Memorial Hosp., 272 S.C. 403, 252 S.E.2d 296 (1979)(refusing to make an exception
to the governmental immunity doctrine to allow recovery of damages resulting from a
governmentally created nuisance).
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ernmental immunity was abrogated to a limited extent by the
"defect" statutes which allowed recovery of tort claims arising
out of defects in state,9 county,10 or city11 maintained roadways.
The municipal "defect" statute1 2 had been construed to deny re-
covery for loss of consortium.13 Plaintiff Watford, however, ar-
gued that substantial differences between the new law and the
"defect" statutes support the view that the General Assembly
intended to create a more liberal right of recovery under the
Tort Claims Act. 4 First, the Act created a new legislative
scheme, consolidating under a single statute authorization for
claims against "any office, department, agency, authority, com-
mission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other
instrumentality" of the state15 for the negligent operation of a
vehicle by a government employee. The Act also seemed to place
the state in the position of a private party defendant by provid-
ing recovery for "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of
property, or any other injury or loss that a person may suffer to
his person or property, that would be actionable at law if in-
flicted by or through the fault of a private person or his agent."16
Finally, the amount of compensation permitted under the Tort
Claims Act was substantially greater than had been allowed
against the highway department under the "defect" statute."7
These arguments were rejected by three of the five justices,
who found no legislative intent to create new grounds for third-
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-5-1810 (1976). This section was amended by the act that
created the Tort Claims Act and the portion that had allowed recovery for negligent
operation of state motor vehicles was deleted. 1968 S.C. Acts 3027, No. 1273.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-17-810 (1976).
11. Id. § 5-7-70.
12. Id.
13. See Brazell v. City of Camden, 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221 (1961); Hollifield v.
Keller, 238 S.C. 584, 121 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
14. Brief of Appellant at 5.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-220(1) (1976).
16. Id. § 15-77-220(5).
17. At the time of its passage, the Tort Claims Act allowed recovery of up to $10,000
for personal injury and $5,000 for property loss or damage, the total for a single mishap
not to exceed $25,000. 1968 S.C. Acts 3027, No. 1273. Before 1968, liability of the high-
way department was not to exceed $3,000 for property damage by 1959 S.C. Acts 297,
No. 157 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-5-1810 (1976)) and possible recovery for
personal injury or death was set at $8,000 by 1953 S.C. Acts 54, No. 53 (current version




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
party recovery."' Quoting from a case in which the court had de-
nied recovery for loss of consortium under the municipal "de-
fect" statute, Justice Rhodes, on behalf of the majority, wrote:
"We cannot, by interpretation, expand or enlarge the provisions
of the said statute. To hold otherwise would have the effect of
broadening the permissory statute by judicial decree and bring
about that which the Legislature has within its perogative not
done." 19 He stressed that the Tort Claims Act limits a plaintiff's
recovery to injuries suffered to "his person or property. ' 2 Loss
of consortium is a derivative action based on a husband's legal
obligation2 1 and, therefore, is not an injury to "his person or
property" within the provisions of the statute.22
Despite the Watford decision, there seem to be ample
grounds for allowing recovery for loss of consortium under the
Tort Claims Act without sacrificing reasonable and practicable
construction of the statute. By abrogating absolute sovereign im-
munity, the legislature indicated a willingness to have the state
assume the costs that would otherwise burden a party injured
through the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a state
employee. Loss of consortium is a derivative claim, but to a hus-
band whose wife has been permanently disabled, it is an injury
to him nonetheless. Without relief, he must bear the burden of a
loss that would entitle him to compensation in an action against
a private party. Long before adoption of the Tort Claims Act,
the common law recognized the need for compensating a hus-
band for physical harm to his wife.23 Notably, recovery for loss
of consortium has been allowed against the federal government
18. Watford v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 273 S.C. at 466, 257 S.E.2d at 230
(Ness and Gregory, J.J., dissenting).
19. Id. (quoting Hollifield v. Keller, 238 S.C. 584, 598-99, 121 S.E.2d 213, 220
(1961)).
20. 273 S.C. at 466, 257 S.E.2d at 230.
21. Consortium includes spousal society, companionship, and services. Because a
husband is required to furnish necessities to his wife, he has the right to recover for
harm to her. Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 475-76, 154 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1967). A
married woman was not entitled to recover for loss of consortium under common law,
but was given the right statutorily in 1969 with the enactment of what is now S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-75-20 (1976). For a discussion of loss of consortium, see Comment, Dam-
ages-Husband and Wife, Parent and Child-Punitive Damages Disallowed in Hus-
band's Cause of Action Arising Out of Injuries To His Wife and Minor Child, 19 S.C.L.
REv. 871 (1967).
22, 273 S.C. at 466, 257 S.E.2d at 230.
23. See note 21 supra.
208 [Vol. 32
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 4
By choosing to interpret narrowly the terms of the statute
as applied to the facts in Watford, the court did not find rele-
vant its own warning in an earlier case that "extremely strict
construction" of the Tort Claims Act would defeat its purpose,
which was "clearly remedial in nature" and designed to protect
"those persons who have sustained damage and injury."25 In-
stead, the court reaffirmed the strict standard of Morris v. South
Carolina Highway Department,26 which concluded that "it is
the duty of the court to construe the Acts waiving sovereign im-
munity so as to uphold the power of the State to refuse to be
sued by a citizen in its own court, except in those instances
where the State has expressly consented to be sued. '27 With the
supreme court presently taking the position that it is the guard-
ian of governmental immunity, lawyers should look to the Gen-
eral Assembly rather than the courts for any further restriction
of that doctrine when bringing suits pursuant to the Govern-
mental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act.
II. LIBEL AND SLANDER
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Mc-
Gill,2s held that an absolute privilege29 protects state legislators
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,
together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bell,
354 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1965); McCluggage v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio
1966); Kolesar v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
25. Truesdale v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 264 S.C. 221, 227-28, 213 S.E.2d
740, 743 (1975).
26. 264 S.C. 369, 215 S.E.2d 430 (1975).
27. Id. at 374, 215 S.E.2d at 432-33.
28. 273 S.C. 142, 255 S.E.2d 341 (1979).
29. The court explained that
[p]rivileged communications in the law of libel and slander are either absolute
or qualified. "When the communication is absolutely privileged, no action will
5
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from defamation suits arising from remarks made outside legis-
lative proceedings. Overcoming the absence of constitutional or
statutory immunity from libel and slander actions,30 the court
based its decision on the broad application of absolute privilege
to other kinds of communications and a public policy that his-
torically has favored the protection of government representa-
tives. The decision provides protection for legislative communi-
cations whenever the representative has an "official interest" '
in the subject matter of his remarks. A legislator qualifies for the
privilege if he is engaged in a "legislative duty or process,
'8 2
even though he is outside the statehouse and speaks about mat-
ters which are of interest only in his district.
The defamation suit in Richardson was brought against
State Representative Frank McGill for remarks allegedly made
about the competence and morals of Williamsburg County Rec-
reation Department Director George Richardson 3 during a pri-
vate meeting of the Williamsburg County legislative delegation
and the county recreation commission in September 1975.84 At
that time the legislative delegation was charged with appropriat-
lie for its publication, no matter what the circumstances under which it is pub-
lished. When qualified, however, the plaintiff may recover if he shows that it
was actuated by malice."
Id. at 145, 255 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 493, 38
S.E.2d 641, 642 (1946)).
30. In Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 n.5 (1951), Justice Frankfurter listed
forty-one states that have speech or debate clauses in their constitutions protecting the
legislative privilege to speak and act without fear of criminal or civil liability. These
provisions are similar to those found in the federal constitution protecting members of
Congress "for any Speech or Debate." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. South Carolina offers con-
stitutional protection for legislators only from arrests for misdemeanors and criminal and
civil summons for a period beginning ten days before and ending ten days after the Gen-
eral Assembly session. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 14.
The common-law principle that would restrict absolute privilege to communications
in legislative or judicial proceedings has been recognized but never applied by the state's
courts. See, e.g., Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. 287, 296, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429
(1951).
31. See Richardson v. McGill, 273 S.C. at 146, 255 S.E.2d at 343.
32. Id.
33. McGill's remarks allegedly were:
"That people are dissatisfied with George Richardson, that he is incompetent.
That he was going with the women in the Department and no woman would be
hired unless George Richardson could go to bed with them and as a result he
would hire no married women."
Id. at 144, 255 S.E.2d at 342.
34. Id.
6
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ing county funds and recommending appointees to the recrea-
tion commission. Furthermore, the recreation commission was
required to file an annual report of its operations, expenditures,
and activities with the legislative delegation, 5 although it super-
vised the recreation department and retained hiring and firing
power over its employees, 38 which included Richardson. Given
these circumstances, the supreme court concluded that McGil
had an "official interest" in the operations and personnel of the
Williamsburg County Recreation Commission and a legitimate
reason to speak out against Richardson.3 7 According to the
court, "[u]nder the present facts, public policy mandated that
legislators be permitted to pursue reports of incompetent or ille-
gal behavior involving appointed county personnel without
the necessity of having to justify their actions in a suit for
defamation."38
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that
the class of absolutely privileged communications should be
"practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and
acts of state,3 9 it has not adhered to this view. Absolute privi-
lege has been applied in a variety of circumstances including
those involving letters between attorneys, 0 letters between pri-
vate parties, 41 the probating of a libelous will,42 communications
in an arbitration proceeding,43 and petitioning the General As-
sembly for redress of grievances." Moreover, as the court noted
in Richardson, "[a] sound public policy has long recognized an
absolute immunity of members of legislative bodies for acts in
the performance of their duties. ' 45 Historically, the view has
35. Id. at 147, 255 S.E.2d at 343.
36. See Brief of Respondent at 5-6.
37. 273 S.C. at 146, 255 S.E.2d at 343.
38. Id. at 147, 255 S.E.2d at 343.
39. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. at 296, 67 S.E.2d at 429. For appli-
cation of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings, see, e.g., McKesson & Robbins v.
Newsome, 206 S.C. 269, 33 S.E.2d 585 (1945); Lybrand v. State Co., 179 S.C. 208, 184
S.E. 580 (1936); Sanders v. Rollinson, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 447 (1848); Vausse v. Lee, 19
S.C.L. (1 Hill) 197 (1833).
40. See Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 6, 7 S.E. 517, 517 (1940).
41. See State v. Drake, 122 S.C. 350, 351, 115 S.E. 297, 298 (1922).
42. See Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 204-06, 48 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1948).
43. See Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.S.C.
1968).
44. See Reid v. Delorme, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 76, 79 (1806).
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been that for a representative to carry out his duties "with firm-
ness and success . . . he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech . . . protected from the resentment of every one."'46
Subject to the sole limitation that the communication be
"connected with, or relevant or material to the matter under in-
quiry, '47 the privilege protecting McGill is extensive. When a
legislator has an "official interest," his remarks are privileged,
and, under the facts in Richardson, he can claim immunity by
showing a connection to the defamed party that is only inciden-
tal to his legislative duties. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has interpreted the legislative privilege to be much
more limited and has recently reaffirmed this position in Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire.48 The speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution and the South Carolina legislative privilege
are based on the same policy favoring legislative freedom that
was adopted "as a matter of course ' 49 when the United States
was founded, but the Supreme Court found nothing in the
clause or its history manifesting an intention on the part of the
framers to extend absolute immunity to remarks made outside
the Capitol Chambers." Moreover, Hutchinson held that protec-
tion under the speech or debate clause is limited to conduct es-
sential to the deliberative process51 and does not protect "all
conduct relating to the legislative process.
'52
Most notable in Richardson is the failure of the court to
consider the countervailing interests of the allegedly defamed
person in protecting his character and reputation. A more bal-
anced decision might have weighed Richardson's rights against
the public interest to be protected by the absolute privilege. The
court also could have addressed the quality of the representa-
tive's interest and the value of his communication to the legisla-
tive inquiry involved. The "official interest" of a representative
46. Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 373 (quoting 2 WORKS OF JAMES WHSON 38
(Andrews ed. 1896)(quoting James Wilson, member of the Committee of Detail which
was responsible for the speech or debate clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 6)).
47. 273 S.C. at 146, 255 S.E.2d at 343.
48. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
49. The history of legislative immunity was traced by Justice Frankfurter in Tenny
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2684.
51. Id. at 2686.
52. Id. (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972)).
212 [Vol. 32
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should not exceed his authority and when he has no authority
there is no reason for a representative to have special protection.
Conversely, when a representative's authority is greatest, protec-
tion should be most extensive. Requiring only the presence of an
"official interest," no matter how incidental to the legislator's
duties, 5s is not satisfactory because an "official interest" cannot
account for all of a representative's motives when he acts within
such a broad range of activities. The Richardson decision, how-
ever, creates an irrebuttable presumption that a legislator will
not make defamatory remarks in the absence of public concern.
The questionable validity of this presumption is compounded by
the court's refusal to consider legitimate interests of potential
plaintiffs.
Although the court's analysis is not satisfactory in theory, as
a practical matter, Richardson presents an anomalous situation.
As rare as libel and slander actions are, defamation suits against
a state representative are even less common. Furthermore, with
the adoption of home rule in South Carolina resulting in more
clearly demarcated boundaries between state and local govern-
ments,54 a state legislator's sphere of duties is more easily de-
fined and an incidental association is less likely to be within the
ambit of an official interest. Most significantly, the facts in Rich-
ardson illustrate how far beyond legislative and judicial proceed-
ings the court has decided to extend a legislator's absolute privi-
lege of communication.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Traditionally in South Carolina, the statute of limitations
for a legal malpractice action began running at the time of injury
to the client .5 The difficulty with this rule, of course, was that
the statute might bar a claim before the injury could be discov-
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590, Comment a (1977) recommends that an
absolute privilege be granted to representatives performing a "legislative function" that
is not confined to the floor of the legislative body or to the time the legislature is in
session. The privilege recommended by the Restatement, however, would not protect a
legislator "who engages in other activities incidentally related to legislative affairs but
not a part of the legislative process itself."
54. See 1975 S.C. Acts 692, No. 283 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-10 to -
1230 (1976)).
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ered. Faced with this classic problem in Mills v. Killian,56 the
South Carolina Supreme Court chose not to impose that harsh
result and struck down the. old rule in favor of tolling the statute
of limitations until the claimant discovers he has been harmed.57
Practitioners should note that although the old practice fixed
the term of a lawyer's malpractice exposure, under the new rule
the period is indeterminable.5 '
The cause of action in Mills arose from an attorney's failure
to find notice of a second mortgage on a property deed while
preparing a foreclosure for a savings and loan association in
1958. In 1975, the holder of the second mortgage attempted to
foreclose against the property owners, who joined their predeces-
sor in title, the savings and loan association. The savings and
loan, which had given a general warranty deed on the property,
joined the attorney in order to crossclaim against him for negli-
gence in the event that they were held liable.5 9 The six-year60 or
ten-year6 l statute of limitations, raised by the lawyer in de-
fense, 2 would have barred the savings and loan's claim under
the old rule. The supreme court concluded, however, that impos-
ing the statute when the savings and loan did not know of the
error during the limitations period would be "manifestly un-
fair."'6 3 The court decided, as many courts have in the past ten
years,64 that it is "more equitable and rational" to toll the stat-
ute until the client discovers his injury.65
56. 273 S.C. 66, 254 S.E.2d 556 (1979).
57. Id. at 70, 254 S.E.2d at 558.
58. See R. MALLEN & V. LEviT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 204, at 286 (1977).
59. 273 S.C. at 67-68, 254 S.E.2d at 557.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides a six-year statute of
limitations for "[a]n action for criminal conversation or for any other iniury to the per-
son or rights of another, not arising on contract, not hereinafter enumerated, and those
provided for in § 15-3-545." Section 15-3-545 provides for actions for medical malprac-
tice. See note 74 infra. Other actions enumerated in the section include wrongful death,
fraud, recovery under an insurance policy, and recovery against directors or stockholders
of a moneyed corporation or banking association. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(6)-(9)
(1976).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-600 (1976) provides that "[a]n action for relief not pro-
vided for in this chapter must be commenced within 10 years after the cause of action
shall have accured."
62. 273 S.C. at 69, 254 S.E.2d at 558.
63. Id. at 70, 254 S.E.2d at 558.
64. See cases cited note 76 infra.
65. 273 S.C. at 70, 254 S.E.2d at 558.
[Vol. 32
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In 1977, the General Assembly enacted a statute that tolls
the six-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims un-
til the claimant "knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known that he had a cause of action." 66 This statu-
tory "discovery rule16 7 probably could be applied to post-1977
attorney malpractice actions. Since it does not apply to contract
actions, however, and since malpractice claims have elements of
both tort and contract, that application would not be certain.
Mills would render futile any prospective attempt to raise as a
bar to an attorney malpractice action the six-year statute of lim-
itations for contract actions68 or the ten-year statute of limita-
tions for "any other action" not expressly covered by statute,69
neither of which is subject to the statutory rule providing that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run on personal in-
jury causes of action until the injury is discovered.
The old practice furthered traditional objectives of the stat-
ute of limitations-preventing stale claims, protecting potential
defendants' reasonable expectations of not being sued long after
the event, and discouraging claimants from "sleeping on their
rights"7°--but the results of application of the "occurrence rule"
could be indisputably harsh.71 Most clients, understanding little
of the law, 2 stand in a relationship of trust with their lawyers.
Often a lawyer works without assistance of the client or other
lawyers, and carelessness, particularly in a property transaction,
may remain undetected for a long period of time. Denying recov-
ery on a valid claim because of strict application of the statute
of limitations could impose on an injured party a greater burden
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides: "Except as to actions
initiated under § 15-3-545 of the 1976 Code, all actions initiated under Item 5 of § 15-3-
530 as amended, shall be commenced within six years after the person knew or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action."
67. The court's use of the term "discovery rule," 273 S.C. at 70, 254 S.E.2d at 558, in
reference to the tolling of the statute of limitations until the cause of action is discovered
is apparently in keeping with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp.
33 (D.S.C. 1976); R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 58, § 204, at 284-89.
68. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (1976).
69. See id. § 15-3-600.
70. See Kelley, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations:
Reflections on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. Rav. 1641, 1643-45 (1978).
71. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 58, § 201, at 270.
72. See Comment, Martin v. Clemhents: The Statute of Limitations for Attorney




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
than a reasonable policy demands.73 The South Carolina General
Assembly realized the harshness of such a rule on medical mal-
practice claims,7 4 as well as other personal injury actions.7
5
Therefore, the supreme court, concurring with the General As-
sembly, wisely joined the national trend,7 6 and applied to attor-
ney malpractice claims the rule that a cause of action will accrue
upon discovery of the injury.
73. See Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 39 (D.S.C. 1976). In Gattis, a medical
malpractice suit, the court correctly predicted that South Carolina would adopt the "dis-
covery" rule and that a cause of action would accrue when the plaintiff discovered or by
reasonable means should have discovered the facts from which the cause of action arose.
Id. This rule was adopted, but by statute. See note 74 infra.
74. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1979), which provides:
Any action to recover damages for injury to the person arising out of any
medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation by any licensed
health care provider as defined in Article 2 of Chapter 59 of Title 38 shall be
commenced within three years from the date of the treatment, omission or op-
eration giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery
or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years
from date of occurrence. When the action is for damages arising out of the
placement and inadvertent, accidental or unintentional leaving of a foreign ob-
ject in the body or person of any one of the negligent placement of any appli-
ance or apparatus in or upon any such person by any licensed health care pro-
vider by reason of any medical, surgical or dental treatment or operation, such
action shall be commenced within two years from date of discovery or when it
reasonably ought to have been discovered; provided, however, that the provi-
sions of this section shall apply only to causes of action which arise after June
10, 1977, and, as to causes of action which arise prior to June 10, 1977, the
Statute of Limitations existing prior to June 10, 1977, shall apply.
75. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
76. For cases on attorney malpractice, see, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019
(6th Cir. 1975); Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Sabo, 432 F. Supp. 76 (D. Del. 1977); Neel
v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr.
837 (1971); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1973); Kohler v. Woollen, Brown, and
Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973); Cameron v. Montgomery, 225
N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1975); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974);
Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 94 Nev. 127, 581 P.2d 851 (1978); McKee v. Riordan, 116 N.H.
729, 366 A.2d 472 (1976); United States Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 548 P.2d 966
(1976); Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976); Family Say. & Loan,
Inc. v. Ciccarello, 157 W. Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974).
Maryland, already having held that the statute of limitations would be tolled in
professional malpractice cases sounding in negligence involving doctors and engineers
until discovery of the injury, was apparently the first state to apply the rule to attorney
malpractice. In a case arising from an allegedly negligent title search, the Maryland Su-
preme Court reasoned that lawyers should be held to the same principle imposed on
other professionals even though the attorney-client relationship is contractual. Mumford
v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969).
12




The South Carolina Supreme Court struck down the Auto-
mobile Guest Statute7 7 in Ramey v. Ramey,78 holding that the
statute violated the guest-passenger's constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.79 After Ramey, a guest-passenger no longer
must show intentional, reckless, or heedless misconduct to re-
cover damages from a host-driver. Less apparent, but significant
to future claims by injured-automobile guests, was the implicit
substitution of the reasonable care negligence standard for the
"slight care" standard provided for in the statute.80
The guest statute, by requiring a plaintiff to prove more
than ordinary negligence, modified general common-law notions
of personal injury recovery for the sake of protecting the guest-
host relationship and preventing collusive lawsuits. 1 Under the
guest statute, the degree of care owed a nonpaying guest was less
than that owed a paying passenger, an approach similar to the
one employed by the law of bailments, which, in establishing re-
quired degrees of care, distinguishes gratuitous bailees from
bailees for hire.8 2 Thus, the standard of care was determined by
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976). The Automobile Guest Statute provided:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for
damages against such motor vehicle or its owner or operator for injury, death
or loss in case of an accident unless such accident shall have been intentional
on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his
reckless disregard of the rights of others.
This section shall not relieve a public carrier or any owner or operator of a
motor vehicle which is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser of re-
sponsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger while being transported
by such public carrier or while such motor vehicle is being so demonstrated.
Id.
78. - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979). For a discussion of the constitutional signifi-
cance of the Ramey case, see Constitutional Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 29, 29 (1980).
79. Ruby Ramey brought suit against her husband alleging his negligence caused
her injuries sustained as a guest-passenger in an automobile accident. Her husband ad-
mitted responsibility for the mishap, but denied any intentional, reckless, willful, or
wanton misconduct on his part. Mrs. Ramey claimed that by not allowing her to sue her
husband for simple negligence, the guest statute violated both the United States and
South Carolina Constitutions. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 883.
80. See Comment, The Common Law Basis of Automobile Guest Statutes, 43 U.
Cm. L. REV. 798, 809-14 (1976).
81. Ramey v. Ramey, - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 884.
82. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 181-84 (4th ed. 1971);
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the relationship of the driver to the passenger.8 3 The supreme
court rejected this scheme in Ramey, finding no significant dif-
ference between automobile guests and "all other recipients of a
host's generosity," or between nonpaying guests and paying pas-
sengers 4 It affirmed the trial court's holding that there is "no
rational justification for singling out persons injured in automo-
bile accidents as different from all others injured in negligent
torts."' 5
The court also noted that "[p]rior to the enactment of the
guest statute in 1930, the common law imposed a duty of reason-
able care on those who transported nonpaying guests."86 Actu-
ally, prior to 1930, South Carolina, unlike most states, had no
judicial pronouncement on the standard of care owed automo-
bile guests. In other jurisdictions either of two common-law
viewpoints prevailed. The majority held that a "voluntary un-
dertaker should. . be required to exercise that degree of care
and caution which would seem reasonable and proper from the
character of the thing undertaken, ' 87 while the minority held
that "[j]ustice requires that the one who undertakes to perform
a duty gratuitously should not be under the same measure of
83. Ramey v. Ramey, - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 887 (Littlejohn, J.,
dissenting).
84. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 885-86. The court apparently was referring to the duty
of the host not to take affirmative action to injure a guest (a licensee), and not a duty to
inspect and warn the guest. Paying passengers, on the other hand, are to be accorded the
"highest degree of care" by common carriers. Sutton v. Southern Ry., 82 S.C. 345, 348,
64 S.E. 401, 402 (1909). In actual application, the care owed by a common carrier is no
more than "a prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care" in the same situation
would provide. Poliakoff v. Shelton, 193 S.C. 398, 403, 8 S.E.2d 494, 496 (1940)(quoting
Louisville & I. R. Co., 152 Ky. 719, 154 S.W. 16 (1913)).
This view of the duty owed by common carriers is recognized by some
commentators:
A majority of courts uphold an instruction to the jury which exacts of a com-
mon carrier of passengers for hire, toward the passenger, the highest degree of
care and forethought consistent with practical operation of the business . ..
[T]here is general agreement that the reasonable man engaged in the public
transportation business would recognize the great potential dangers which at-
tend rapid transit. .. .In view of this it is not at all clear that the instruction
actually imposes on the carrier a standard different from that of ordinary care
under the circumstances.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 947-48 (1956). See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 82, § 34, at 181.
85. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 883.
86. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 884.
87. Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 124, 103 A. 4, 6 (1918).
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obligation as one who enters upon the same undertaking for
pay."88 Obviously the minority position imposed a standard of
care similar to that of the South Carolina Guest Statute, while
the majority adopted the standard of ordinary care.89 Now that
the guest statute has been struck down, it is important to note
what standard the court adopted.
The court found that automobile guests are similarly situ-
ated to other types of guests.9 0 By no longer requiring a showing
of reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct as required by the
statute, plaintiff could now go forward with the suit based on
simple negligence. Thus, the supreme court effectively joined the
majority of courts that imposed reasonable care as the standard
of negligence prior to widespread adoption of the guest statutes.
While the court did not expressly reinstate the common-law
standard of ordinary care, it seems certain that this standard
will be applied now that the lower standard imposed by statute
has been held invalid.
Charles L. Henshaw, Jr.
88. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 516, 118 N.E. 168, 177 (1917). See also 5
BLASHFIELD AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 211.1-.2 (3d ed. 1966).
89. See generally Comment, supra note 80.
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